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Stephen Hawking and Leonard Molodinow’s (HM) The Grand Design1 faces 
some of the big questions of the human thought: “Why is there something 
rather than nothing? Why do we exist? Why this particular set of laws and 
not some other?” (p. 10, p. 171). Their answer is rooted in the concepts of 
“scientific determinism” (p. 30, p. 34) and “model-dependent realism” (p. 7). 
According to this epistemological view, “our perception—and hence the 
observations upon which our theories are based—is not direct, but rather 
is shaped by a kind of lens, the interpretive structure of our human brains” 
(p. 46), so “a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own” (p. 172).
This background helps to understand some of the most controversial 
assertions of the book. In physics, scientists may prefer one model from 
another when the former explains more experiments and does it better. 
1 Hawking, Stephen, and Leonard Mlodinow. 2010. The Grand Design. New York: Bantam 
Books.
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However, once we have the same explanatory power for different models, 
there is neither possibility nor need to make a decision among them. Real-
ity becomes a ‘model-dependent reality’. Now, HM’s claim is that M-theo-
ry—“candidate for the ultimate theory of everything” (p. 8)—would already 
be able to explain and predict all physics involved in the universe, as well as 
their origin. With this explanation, God is no longer necessary. Of course, 
everybody is free to continue having this belief/ or “his/her faith” within 
his/her model-dependent reality.
Quantum Mechanics and the strong version of the anthropic principle 
are the main ingredients for the self-explanation of the universe. “Like 
a particle, the universe doesn’t have just a single history, but every possible 
history, each with its own probability; and our observations of its current 
state affect its past and determine the different histories of the universe, 
just as the observations of the particles in the double-slit experiment affect 
the particles’ past” (p. 83). It is then the very presence of human observa-
tions of the universe what selects its adequate past, in a (sort of) self-con-
sistent process.
Certainly, “when the beings on a planet that supports life examine the 
world around them, they are bound to find that their environment satisfies 
the conditions they require to exist […]. Our very existence imposes rules 
determining from where and at what time it is possible for us to observe 
the universe. That is, the fact of our being restricts the characteristics of 
the kind of environment in which we find ourselves” (pp. 153–154). This 
principle is called the ‘weak anthropic principle’. However, for HM, “a bet-
ter term than ‘anthropic principle’ would have been ‘selection principle’, 
because the principle refers to how our own knowledge of our existence 
imposes rules that select, out of all the possible environments, only those 
environments with the characteristics that allow life” (p. 154). To sum up: 
“The fact that we exist imposes constraints not just on our environment but 
on the possible form and content of the laws of nature themselves” (p. 155).
The most precise way in which the physics of the entire process works 
is described in p. 180: “Because gravity shapes space and time, it allows 
space-time to be locally stable but globally unstable. On the scale of the 
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entire universe, the positive energy of the matter can be balanced by the 
negative gravitational energy, and so there is no restriction on the creation 
of whole universes. Because there is a law like gravity, the universe can 
and will create itself from nothing […]. Spontaneous creation is the reason 
there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we 
exist. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and 
set the universe going”.
Last but not least, the grand design of M-theory changes our under-
standing of free will: “Though we feel that we can choose what we do, our 
understanding of the molecular basis of biology shows that biological pro-
cesses are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as 
determined as the orbits of the planets […]. It is hard to imagine how free will 
can operate if our behavior is determined by physical law, so it seems that we 
are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion” 
(pp. 31–32). Of course, “since we cannot solve the equations that determine 
our behavior, we use the effective theory that people have free will” (p. 33). 
In fact, HM say “that any complex being has free will—not as a fundamental 
feature, but as an effective theory, an admission of our inability to do the 
calculations that would enable us to predict its actions” (p. 178). Since I will 
not refer to the question of free will until the last part of my article, let me 
point out here that there is a way to differentiate the human mind from an 
algorithmic Turing machine.2 HM do not make any mention of it.
* * *
HM’s book has a large number of inexact claims. Sometimes the authors 
seem to simply express a wish: “Philosophy is dead” (p. 5). Others, they 
neglect the antique and medieval thinkers: “The Ionian idea that the uni-
verse is not human-centered was a milestone in our understanding of the 
cosmos, but it was an idea that would be dropped and not picked up again, 
or commonly accepted, until Galileo, almost twenty centuries later” (p. 22). 
2 See, e.g., Ch. 4 in Penrose, Roger. 1989. The Emperor’s New Mind. Concerning Computers, 
Minds, and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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In addition, they misinterpret the history of thought: statements which 
say Aristotle rejected the idea of science based principally on observation 
(cf. p. 23), and “suppressed facts he found unappealing and focused his 
efforts on the reasons things happen, with relatively little energy invested 
in detailing exactly what was happening” (p. 24) are mistaken, as well as 
saying that “among the heresies [condemned by Tempier] was the idea that 
nature follows laws, because this conflicts with God’s omnipotence” (p. 25). 
However, sometimes they simply are badly uninformed, since Galileo was 
not convicted for heresy (cf. p. 87).
We can also find internal contradictions along different argumenta-
tions. Within the framework of the M-theory (of everything), saying that 
“decisions are often not rational” (p. 33) or that “simplicity is a matter of 
taste” (p. 39) would be meaningless, because one has no basis to make such 
distinctions. Similarly, when HM claim that “according to model-dependent 
realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees 
with observation. If there are two models that both agree with observation 
[…], the one cannot say that one is more real than another. One can use 
whichever model is more convenient in the situation under consideration” 
(p. 46), one should ask what does the word ‘convenient’ mean in this global 
theory. On the other hand, the explanation may be tough, as the difference 
between the bottom-up and the top-bottom approaches (cf. pp. 139–140), 
or may present, a more subtle internal contradiction. For instance, what is 
the criterion to distinguish —as they certainly do— between the local and 
the global scale of the entire universe in p. 180? If “we are the product of 
quantum fluctuations in the very early universe” (p. 139), how is it possible 
that, as stated before, the presence of human beings selects the universe 
which we inhabit? Who is who’s product? Even HM’s analogy between the 
selection of universes and the natural selection of evolution in biology 
is flawed, because evolution develops through transitions among actual 
species, while HM’s book does not explain how the universe that we dwell 
in turns out to be fixed in its physical laws.
Misleading assertions can also be found from a scientific point of view. 
The claim that the anthropic principle can be used to make predictions 
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(cf. p. 154) is irrelevant for the main issue of the book, since it does in the 
same manner that we can predict a star’s age or formation when we know 
about its composition. HM seem to forget the precise causality limits given 
by the null cones in Minkowski space when they affirm that: “In space-time, 
time is no longer separate from the three dimensions of space, and, loosely 
speaking, just as the definition of left/right, forward/backward, or up/down 
depends on the orientation of the observer, so too does the direction of 
time vary depending on the speed of the observer” (pp. 99–100). Unproven 
assumptions are frequent. We can offer three examples: (a) “So though we 
do not yet have a complete quantum theory of gravity, we do know that the 
origin of the universe was a quantum event” (p. 131). However, Penrose pre-
sents a model for a Big Bang stemming from a smooth transition between 
aeons, where quantum gravity is not invoked; the assumption of finite Weyl 
curvature being enough3. (b) “Once we add the effects of quantum theo-
ry to the theory of relativity, in extreme cases warpage can occur to such 
a great extent that time behaves like another dimension of space” (p. 134). 
This simply remains to be proven within such an up-to-date lacking theory. 
(c) “For a theory of gravity to predict finite quantities, the theory must have 
what is called supersymmetry between the forces of nature and the matter 
on which they act” (pp. 180–181). But this needs not to be the case4.
* * *
Let’s enter now into a deeper criticism of HM’s basic ideas in their grand 
design. Regarding physics, the authors invoke (cf. pp. 55–58) the well-
known wave-particle dualism to defend their model-dependent realism 
and their assumption of an all-encompassing M-theory, which gathers all 
different partial theories explaining different aspects of reality. Now, while 
the wave-particle dualism is well explained by Quantum Mechanics, as 
a better theory in which either the wave or the particle behavior can be 
3 See, e.g., Ch. 3.5 in Penrose, Roger. 2010. Cycles of Time. An Extraordinary New View of the 
Universe. London: The Bodley Head.
4 As, e.g., stated in chapters 32–33 of Penrose, Roger. 2004. The Road to Reality. A Complete 
Guide to the Laws of the Universe. London: Jonathan Cape.
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retrieved within proper limits, M-theory remains currently a mysterious 
theory, much more unknown than the more elemental string theories from 
which it is supposed to be formed.
However, let’s imagine that M-theory has already acquired the level 
of a respected theory for everything. Is this really true? Does M-theory 
really explain all the experimentally-accessible reality? Does it explain, 
for instance, the Second Law of Thermodynamics or the very notion of 
entropy? It is remarkable that along the 198 pages of the book, the concept 
of entropy is absent. HM acknowledge that “for our theoretical models of 
inflation to work, the initial state of the universe had to be set up in a very 
special and highly improbable way. Thus traditional inflation theory re-
solves one set of issues but creates another—the need for a very special 
initial state” (pp. 130–131). Though, “that time-zero issue is eliminated in 
the theory of the creation of the universe we are about to describe” (p. 131). 
It is strange not to find a single word or reference on the estimate given 
by Penrose about the degree of ‘specialness’ of that initial state, given the 
Bekenstein-Hawking formula for the entropy of a black hole5.
Of course, HM are free to assume the Hartle-Hawking (HH) “no bound-
ary condition” as their favorite initial condition for the path integral over 
universe histories. Nevertheless, since this technique involves the Euclide-
anization of the theory, some words might have been said on the problems 
of the eventual analytic continuation of the final solution. Perhaps this 
calculation, implemented with the requirements of the strong anthropic 
principle, might offer a self-consistent, smooth, and habitable universe. 
But even then, it has to be noted that M-theory is misinterpreted as the 
ultimate scientific explanation; it has to obey the ubiquitous Second Law. 
The putative generic origin of the universe—via the HH no boundary con-
dition—turns out not to be such. The initial state is still special from the 
thermodynamic point of view, and remains to be explained.
HM’s proposal has obviously profound epistemological consequences. 
But some questions about terminology must be posed before. First: do par-
5 See (Penrose 1989, Ch. 7; 2004, Ch. 27; 2010, Ch. 2.6).
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ticular histories of the universe exist or do they not? Second: Why are these 
histories sometimes called ‘universes,’ instead of ‘possible histories of the 
universe,’ that compose the quantum superposition of the universe wave-
function? Third: What is the epistemological difference among the laws of 
nature—seemingly different from one history to another—and the omni-
present M-theory? Why does M-theory itself remain unchanged, as a sort 
of “goddess” or divine theory? The epistemological level of the M-theory 
must be clarified, if “regarding the laws that govern the universe, what we 
can say is this: There seems to be no single mathematical model or theory 
that can describe every aspect of the universe” (p. 58).
According to HM, “people are still trying to decipher the nature of 
M-theory, but that may not be possible. It could be that the physicist’s 
traditional expectation of a single theory of nature is untenable, and there 
exists no single formulation. It might be that to describe the universe, we 
have to employ different theories in different situations. Each theory may 
have its own version of reality, but according to model-dependent realism, 
that is acceptable so long as the theories agree in their predictions when-
ever they overlap, that is, whenever they can both be applied” (p. 117). 
Now, the question is: can a theory which fails to explain the differences 
and overlaps of less fundamental theories be the theory of everything? 
“The laws of M-theory therefore allow for different universes with different 
apparent laws, depending on how the internal space is curled” (p. 118). 
However, are we sure at this point about what a law is and what is not? 
For instance, is the principle of quantum superposition a law? May it be 
changed depending on the way internal dimensions are curled? If not, is 
it some sort of ‘superlaw’? What distinguishes a law and a superlaw? One 
finds throughout HM’s grand design a denial of their claim that “the orig-
inal hope of physicists to produce a single theory explaining the apparent 
laws of our universe as the unique possible consequence of a few simple 
assumptions may have to be abandoned” (p. 119). In fact, what they come 
to say is that “M-theory is the only candidate for a complete theory of the 
universe. If it is finite—and this has yet to be proved—it will be a model of 
a universe that creates itself […]. M-theory is the unified theory Einstein 
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was hoping to find” (p. 181). In short, we find internal inconsistencies on 
epistemological grounds.
It is also necessary to discuss the book’s philosophical statements. HM 
continuously use the term ‘nothing’ as equivalent to the ground state of 
empty space. Of course, their ‘nothing’ has ‘something,’ because ‘vacuum’ 
is not ‘nothing’. HM claim that “M-theory predicts that a great many uni-
verses were created out of nothing. Their creation does not require the 
intervention of some supernatural being or god. Rather, these multiple 
universes arise naturally from physical law” (pp. 8–9). It is then unclear 
whether the multiple universes arise either out of nothing or from physical 
law. Are they perhaps identifying their ‘nothing’ concept with the empty 
space? The answer seems to be irrelevant since, as they point out: “An im-
portant consequence of that [the Heisenberg uncertainty principle] is that 
there is no such thing as empty space” (p. 113). This is a very important 
claim, because it implicitly acknowledges that Physics does not deal with 
concepts like ‘nothing.’ In other words: Physics needs a physical reality to 
study, and the ultimate answer to the question “why is there a universe?” 
(p. 123) does not belong to the realm of Physics. Nevertheless, HM insist 
“that is possible to answer these questions [why is there something rather 
than nothing?; why do we exist?; why this particular set of laws and not 
some other?] purely within the realm of science, and without invoking any 
divine beings” (p. 172). But, after reading the book, one might still ask: Who 
created the law of gravity? Who created M-theory? If these laws need not 
be created, they seem to be divine by themselves. So the universe would 
simply be the expression of an absolute divine law. But has Physics, as 
a science, anything to say about divinity? HM are in my opinion right when 
they claim that God is not necessary to light the universe on. However, God 
is necessary at a deepest, transcendental level that they neglect.
* * *
Yet, the reader may think: All right. But philosophical criticisms are not so 
important. What if they guess correctly after all? Let me explain from the very 
grounds of the physics we know up to date why their main argument is flawed.
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HM’s book contains several arguments based on a petitio principii. For 
instance: “Our presence selects out from this vast array only those univers-
es that are compatible with our existence” (p. 9). We humans must select 
something that is compatible with our existence. But do we not already 
exist? If a living conscious being is to determine the universe in which 
it lives, it has to exist; but it does not exist until the universe has been 
determined by the existence of itself (!) So, the flaw of the argument is: 
how do I myself come to existence within a universe that is determined by 
my own existence? That is a philosophical petitio principii. It is definitely 
a circular argument.
Of course, one could still argue that this argument is just a way to show 
the self-consistent process of the universe expressing itself. This is correct. 
But then, another problem arises, for we can discover the ‘existence’ of 
other universes, there is a clear-cut difference between what my physical 
presence does and what my mind can know. HM cannot avoid dualism. 
Actually, this problem points to a more radical quantum measurement par-
adox. If our human observation selects the histories which are consistent 
with our physical presence, where does the reduction of the universe wave-
function come from? There are only two possibilities: (a) If it is due to hu-
man consciousness, this one has to be originated within one of the possible 
evolving histories. Then, why is human consciousness special (responsible 
for the wavefunction collapse)? (b) If it is because of a physical process, it’s 
no longer true that “we create history by our observation” (p. 140). What 
HM are claiming would imply to have solved the measurement problem of 
Quantum Mechanics. If so, they should not be silent on it. If it is not so, 
HM’s main argument is flawed because they are omitting the explanation 
about how the different paths for the multiverse reach reality.
Another interesting question which HM do not touch upon is the fol-
lowing. Along with the fine tuning of many physical constants ‘to produce 
life’, there are many other measurements in the universe with no direct or 
relevant interest to do so. Therefore, if everything is the way it is because 
of us, sentient and conscious beings, what is our measurable influence in 
those measurements that turn out to be irrelevant for life? In short, if the 
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universe is the work of man, then it should show his mark everywhere, 
which is precisely what we do not observe; rather, we observe something that 
has to have a design6. Perhaps David J. Bartholomew is right and chance, 
together with the laws of probability, is the subtle way God has to introduce 
purpose in the universe7.
* * *
Undoubtedly, HM’s grand design has good points and good scientific in-
tuitions. They present the need of the three spatial dimensions for having 
stable elliptical orbits (cf. pp. 160–161). They affirm quite properly that 
“general relativity has transformed physics into geometry” (p. 102) and 
they admit the mathematical weakness of the renormalization techniques 
(cf. p. 107). Occasionally, they even show correct epistemological argu-
ments regarding, e.g., the Big Bang theory: “Although one can think of the 
big bang picture as a valid description of early times, it is wrong to take the 
big bang literally, that is, to think of Einstein’s theory as providing a true 
picture of the origin of the universe” (pp. 128–129).
Some of their more controversial statements might even push for a bet-
ter philosophical and theological understanding of the creation concept: 
“The realization that time behaves like space presents a new alternative. 
It removes the age-old objection to the universe having a beginning, but 
also means that the beginning of the universe was governed by the laws of 
science and doesn’t need to be set in motion by some god” (p. 135). This 
statement could be shared by a philosophical point of view where God is 
not an efficient, but a transcendental (first) cause of the universe. Perhaps, 
“when one combines the general theory of relativity with quantum theo-
ry, the question of what happened before the beginning of the universe 
is rendered meaningless” (p. 135). HM could be right if, indeed, the very 
6 See, e.g., Rhonheimer, Martin. 2008. “Teoria dell’evoluzione neodarwinista, Intelligent 
Design e creazione. In dialogo con il Cardinal Christoph Schönborn.”Acta Philosophica 17: 
87–132.
7 See Bartholomew, David J. 2008. God, Chance and Purpose. Can God Have It Both Ways? 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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idea of origin of the universe guides directly to God. Because it does not, 
the origin of the universe stays beyond the HM’s perspective as a sort of 
meaningless question.
HM, somehow, pose an important issue when they observe that “our 
universe and its laws appear to have a design that both is tailor-made to 
support us and, if we are to exist, leaves little room for alteration. That 
is not easily explained, and raises the natural question of why it is that 
way” (p. 162). In a sense, their book is very valuable, for it raises aware-
ness of the level of serendipity involved in the evolution of the universe 
(cf. pp. 159–161). However, the main problem is that their central argu-
ments are flawed and their final conclusions deceptive: there is undoubt-
edly (as Hoyle would say) a deliberate design in the laws of physics… but for 
HM it is only ours! As a matter of fact, these arguments are even starting 
to create fancy literature8.
From a theological perspective, the strong anthropic principle assumed 
by HM is the opposite of perceiving God “in what he has made” (Rom 1:20). 
God is substituted by man. It’s us, men, who are ultimately responsible for 
the form the universe has. Pity for the universe and pity for us! But why 
pity? We did it, right? So pity is also a consequence of our conscious being 
producing the universe… Or isn’t it? Fortunately, HM affirm, in their ac-
knowledgements, that “a book does not appear spontaneously from noth-
ing. A book requires a creator” (p. 187). It’s difficult to thank anybody when 
you believe all what is said in this book. Yet, HM are incoherent enough to 
show—though their free thanksgiving attitude—why their grand design 
philosophy is wrong. 
8 See, e.g., Rodriguez Dos Santos, Jose. 2006. A Fórmula De Deus. Lisboa: Gradiva.
